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politics. In 2014, after it became public that Mozilla’s CEO, Brendan Eich, 
had made a controversial political donation in a state ballot proposition, 
consumer pressure led to his resignation. Eich’s downfall and the 
politicization of retail markets means that business leaders are unlikely to 
respond to McCutcheon v. FEC by embracing transparency with their 
campaign donations, and also suggests that campaign finance deregulation 
is causing hydraulic effects that the Supreme Court has failed to anticipate. 
This Essay explores what “economic reprisal” means for business 
leaders—a significant segment of the so-called “donor class”—when 
consumers vote at the cash register. 
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In the Supreme Court’s most recent campaign finance case, 
McCutcheon v. FEC, a bare majority of the Court struck down aggregate 
contribution limits for individuals.1 Whereas an individual’s total campaign 
contributions in a given two-year federal election cycle were previously 
limited to $123,200, individuals may now give as much as $3.6 million.2 
McCutcheon has been praised for pushing campaign cash away from 
“shadow money” nonprofits and into the sunshine of disclosure because it 
clears the way for donors to give large amounts to an unlimited number of 
candidates—a type of spending that is subject to disclosure obligations, 
unlike donations to 501(c) nonprofit groups.3 According to this line of 
thinking, deregulation not only increases the total amount of speech in the 
marketplace of ideas, but also tends to increase transparent speech. Chief 
Justice Roberts, writing for the plurality in McCutcheon, conveyed this idea 
when he wrote that aggregate limits “may in fact encourage the movement 
of money away from entities subject to disclosure.”4 Indeed, Professors 
Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela S. Karlan made just this contention sixteen 
years ago.5  
Though the phrase “hydraulic effects” appears nowhere in 
McCutcheon’s plurality, concurring, or dissenting opinions, the case should 
be understood as endorsing a particular view of how political money is like 
water. As Professors Issacharoff and Karlan famously put it: “[E]very 
 
1 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). Federal law continues to prohibit corporations and unions from making 
these kinds of contributions. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2012). 
2 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1443 (addressing previous limit); id. at 1473 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(observing new limit on spending in election cycle). 
3 Nathaniel Persily, Bringing Big Money Out of the Shadows, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/opinion/bringing-big-money-out-of-the-shadows.html [http://
perma.cc/5J43-NAVX] (“A world in which individuals can give limited, disclosed amounts of money to 
an unlimited number of politicians is preferable to one in which large chunks are given only to ‘super 
PACs’ and other unaccountable outside groups.”). 
4 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1460. 
5 Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. 
L. REV. 1705, 1717–18, 1729 (1999). 
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reform effort to constrain political actors produces a corresponding series 
of reactions by those with power to hold onto it,”6 and “[t]he price of 
apparent containment may be uncontrolled flood damage elsewhere.”7 In 
other words, regulations that limit or reduce certain types of election-
related spending simply channel the money in other directions. 
Unfortunately, the “deregulate and disclose” approach of the Roberts 
Court is unlikely to solve the hydraulics problem that frustrates courts and 
law professors. Wealthy Americans are unlikely to respond to McCutcheon 
as the Chief Justice leads us to believe, by directing a greater proportion of 
their cash away from “shadow money” and into the sunlight of candidate 
contributions. 
An important piece of evidence emerged within days of the 
McCutcheon opinion. On April 3, 2014, Brendan Eich resigned after only 
two weeks as CEO of Mozilla, after public controversy developed over the 
fact that, six years earlier, he gave $1000 to support Proposition 8 in 
California, which banned same-sex marriage.8 Mr. Eich now stands as the 
first CEO in America to have been forced out of his job because of a 
publicly disclosed campaign contribution.9 The story of Brendan Eich 
teaches that campaign donations by corporate CEOs (and, importantly, 
those aspiring to be CEOs) will be scrutinized by customers, employees, 
business partners, and shareholders, even many years after they are made, 
and that publicly disclosed donations may ruin a donor’s future 
employment prospects as chief executive.10 For this reason, CEOs and 
aspiring CEOs should rationally prefer to give in secret, and the premise of 
the Chief Justice—that allowing the wealthy to greatly increase the amount 
they can give directly to candidates will cause them to rechannel their 
funds away from “shadow money” organizations toward transparent, 
disclosing organizations—is likely wrong. 
The Brendan Eich story also suggests that the scope of the problem of 
hydraulic effects—and thus the risks of deregulation—may be greater than 
courts and scholars have acknowledged. Part I of this Essay argues that an 
increasingly politicized retail economy is a consequence of these hydraulic 
 
6 Id. at 1705. 
7 Id. at 1713. 
8 Nick Bilton & Noam Cohen, Mozilla’s Chief Felled by View on Gay Unions, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 
2014, 4:07 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/eich-steps-down-as-mozilla-chief [http://
perma.cc/MGX6-JPTT]. 
9 Mr. Eich’s resignation was reportedly voluntary; in public statements, Mozilla denied that its 
board of directors had asked him to step down as CEO. FAQ on CEO Resignation, MOZILLA BLOG 
(Apr. 5, 2014), https://blog.mozilla.org/blog/2014/04/05/faq-on-ceo-resignation/ [http://perma.cc/5GSV
-TX4R]. 
10 See Kara Swisher, Mozilla Co-Founder Brendan Eich Resigns as CEO, Leaves Foundation 
Board, RE/CODE (Apr. 3, 2014), http://recode.net/2014/04/03/mozilla-co-founder-brendan-eich-resigns-
as-ceo-and-also-from-foundation-board/ [http://perma.cc/CUQ7-QR7Z]. 
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effects. Part II explores how political expression and political power are 
likely to be affected by this development. Part III argues that courts should 
not overreact to consumer activism by setting generous disclosure 
exemption standards based on economic reprisal. 
I. UNCONTROLLED FLOOD DAMAGE: PUNISHING DONORS AT THE  
CASH REGISTER 
Increasingly, it appears that ordinary Americans believe they have lost 
the ability to command the attention of candidates and elected officials 
because they cannot compete with the significant election-related spending 
of the “donor class.”11 This is an elite group of wealthy individuals—
according to the Sunlight Foundation, 31,385 people—who in 2012 
donated more than one-quarter of the money spent on federal elections.12 
The donor class, as it happens, is heavily populated by business leaders and 
CEOs. 
In 2012, nearly 5700 donors in the top group of individual election 
spenders—individuals who contributed a median amount of $26,584 
each—were identified on FEC disclosure forms as “CEO,” “President,” 
“Chairman,” “Executive,” or “Owner” of a business entity.13 One study 
found “phenomenally high” rates of political donations between 1979 and 
2012 by individual corporate officers and directors at Fortune 500 
companies—approximately 83%.14 Some business leaders have their own 
Super PACs.15 In other words, business executives are among the most 
active campaign finance donors and spend, on average, significantly more 
money to influence elections than ordinary Americans do. Economists like 
 
11 See, e.g., Spencer Overton, The Participation Interest, 100 GEO. L.J. 1259, 1262, 1290 (2012) 
(“Individuals with family incomes over $100,000 represented 11% of the population in 2004, cast 
14.9% of the votes, and were responsible for approximately 80% of contributions over $200.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
12 See Lee Drutman, The Political 1% of the 1% in 2012, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (June 24, 2013, 9:00 
AM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/06/24/1pct_of_the_1pct/ [http://perma.cc/4F7J-JZKN]. 
In fact, only 591 individuals donated the maximum of $46,200 to candidates for federal office in 2012. 
See McCutcheon vs FEC, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS (2014), http://www.opensecrets.org/
overview/mccutcheon_about.php [http://perma.cc/U2W5-NQKK]. 
13 See Drutman, supra note 12. 
14 See Adam Bonica, Avenues of Influence: On the Political Expenditures of Corporations and 
Their Directors and Executives 14 (December 3, 2013) (working paper) (available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2313232 [http://perma.cc/JR9-QAWA]) (noting 
that many of those who did not contribute were foreign nationals and thus prohibited by law from 
making contributions). The “lifetime average” of those who made donations was an astonishing 
$197,435 per individual. Id. 
15 See generally Michael Beckel, The Rise of the Vanity Super PACs, SLATE (February 5, 2014), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2014/02/thomas_steyer_michael_bloomberg_
and_jonathan_soros_give_big_to_super_pacs.html [http://perma.cc/JFM2-8BRJ] (discussing, among 
others, Michael Bloomberg’s Super PAC). 
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Thomas Piketty have pointed out that corporate CEOs, who come by their 
wealth through enormous and controversial executive compensation 
arrangements, are a primary vector of income inequality in the United 
States.16 The “Chief Executive Donor” is one of the most significant 
beneficiaries of campaign finance deregulation. 
In a recent survey, 26% of Americans said they were less likely to vote 
because “big donors to Super PACs have so much more influence over 
elected officials than average Americans.”17 The survey found that nearly 
half of Americans with annual household incomes less than $35,000 
believe that their votes “don’t matter very much” because of the influence 
of high-spending donors.18 More than 40 million American households 
have annual incomes of less than $35,000.19 One commentator noted that a 
worker earning the federal minimum wage of $7.25 an hour would have to 
work full-time for more than eight years to earn the federal contribution 
limit of $123,200, which the McCutcheon plurality threw out as too low.20 
One U.S. district court judge, applying Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission21 and McCutcheon in a challenge to New York’s campaign 
finance laws, noted his disagreement with those cases and observed that 
“today’s reality is that the voices of ‘we the people’ are too often drowned 
out by the few who have great resources.”22 
One unintended consequence of Citizens United and McCutcheon may 
be that by disempowering the ordinary American through campaign finance 
deregulation, the Supreme Court is causing “uncontrolled flood damage 
elsewhere”23: It is emboldening ordinary Americans to express their 
 
16 THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 332–33 (Arthur Goldhammer 
trans., 2014). 
17 National Survey: Super PACs, Corruption, and Democracy, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (April 
24, 2012), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/national-survey-super-pacs-corruption-and-demo
cracy [http://perma.cc/HQ9S-46HV]. This opinion was more likely to be voiced by those with an 
annual household income less than $35,000 (34%). Id. 
18 Forty-eight percent of respondents in this income range said they believed “that their votes don’t 
matter very much because big donors to Super PACs have so much more influence.” Id. 
19 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012, at 453 
(2012), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012edition.html [http://perma.cc/SJX7-
VJLA]. Commentators have been quick to link the McCutcheon decision with political opposition to 
raising the minimum wage. See, e.g., Joseph Hines, How McCutcheon Will Make Raising the Minimum 
Wage Even Harder, POLICYSHOP (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.demos.org/blog/4/3/14/how-mccutcheon-
will-make-raising-minimum-wage-even-harder [http://perma.cc/CMY4-N9QN]. 
20 See LeeAnn Hall & Rahna Epting, The Triple Play Against Low-Wage Workers: McCutcheon, 
McConnell, McDonalds, ROLL CALL (April 30, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/the_
triple_play_against_low_wage_workers_mccutcheon_mcconnell_mcdonalds-232524-1.html [http://
perma.cc/YZ94-MFCL]. 
21 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
22 N.Y. Progress & Prot. PAC v. Walsh, 17 F. Supp. 3d 319, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
23 Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 5, at 1713. 
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political voice economically, through acts that hold wealthy donors, rather 
than elected officials, accountable. Citizens are increasingly engaging in 
consumer protests, boycotts, and other forms of pressure directed at 
businesses and, as in the case of Brendan Eich, at specific Chief Executive 
Donors in response to their disclosed political donations. 
Big businesses—particularly publicly held companies and those that 
transact directly with the public—and their leaders are vulnerable to 
consumer action. In 2010, after Citizens United was decided, Target 
Corporation was boycotted in connection with its $150,000 donation to a 
Minnesota group that supported a gubernatorial candidate who opposed 
same-sex marriage.24 Target responded to the controversy almost 
immediately by issuing a public apology.25 In 2011, Starbucks Corporation 
signed on to a brief filed in federal court opposing the Defense of Marriage 
Act and, in 2012, made public statements in support of a bill in Washington 
State to legalize same-sex marriage.26 A few months later, opponents of 
same-sex marriage began a boycott of Starbucks and at the company’s 
annual stockholder meeting in 2012, a stockholder alleged that the boycott 
had depressed the company’s first quarter sales and earnings.27 
Why was Starbucks Corporation speaking out about same-sex 
marriage in the first place? Many public-facing companies have, in recent 
years, taken partisan positions on political issues that have little relevance 
to their operations or profitability. For example, in addition to staking out a 
position on same-sex marriage, Starbucks has declared a commitment to 
“championing progressive climate change policy.”28 In 2013, the CEO of 
Panera Bread blogged about a week-long experiment in which he ate for 
$4.50 per day, the average amount allocated to recipients of federal food 
aid, to protest proposed cuts to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program by Congress.29 
 
24 Andrew Stern, Target Corp Targeted For Political Donation, REUTERS, Aug. 3, 2010, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/03/usa-elections-contributions-idUSN0316847320100803 
[http://perma.cc/YX5E-B426]. There is no evidence that the boycott affected the company’s stock price. 
25 See Brody Mullins & Ann Zimmerman, Target Discovers Downside to Political Contributions, 
WALL ST. J., August 7, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405274870398830457541
3650676561696 [http://perma.cc/C8RJ-B2VG].  
26 Aaron Smith, Starbucks CEO Holds His Ground on Gay Marriage, CNN MONEY (Mar. 28, 
2013, 11:36 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/03/26/news/companies/starbucks-gay-marriage/ [http://
perma.cc/954K-674H]. 
27 Id. 
28 STARBUCKS CORP., STARBUCKS GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT: GOALS AND PROGRESS 2013, 
at 18 (2013), available at http://globalassets.starbucks.com/assets/98e5a8e6c7b1435ab67f2368b1c7447
a.pdf [http://perma.cc/VSS5-5BY5]. 
29 Julie Jargon, ‘A Lot of Carbs’: Panera Bread CEO Learns to Live on $4.50 a Day, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 17, 2013, http://blogs.wsj.com/corporate-intelligence/2013/09/17/a-lot-of-carbs-panera-ceo-learns
-to-live-on-4-50-a-day/ [http://perma.cc/CK6G-ZGUN]. 
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For-profit businesses and their leaders make political stands like these 
to engage in “purpose” or “cause” marketing—a response to growing 
consumer demand to know “what a company stands for.”30 Consumers 
actively monitor news about corporate political activity, and engage with 
companies and other consumers about it online. They also use that 
information to decide what to buy. In a 2013 study, 42% of Americans 
reported boycotting a company’s products or services in the preceding 
twelve months.31 Nearly a third of consumers reported that they had 
researched a company’s “business practices or support of social and 
environmental issues” in the last year.32 A smartphone app allowing 
consumers to learn about the political affiliations of consumer product 
manufacturers with a scan of the bar code cannot be far off. 
Thus, as campaign finance deregulation proceeds under the Roberts 
Court, we should expect to see second-order hydraulic effects play out that 
are quite different from the ones described so far by election law 
scholars—like Issacharoff and Karlan—and Supreme Court case law to 
date. Like first-order hydraulic effects, in which the wealthy seek the path 
of least resistance for their election-related cash, these second-order effects 
involve those with power taking steps to hold onto it. But in second-order 
hydraulic effects, the actors are ordinary citizens who, because of their 
modest financial circumstances, lack influence in campaign finance and see 
consumer action as a more practical and promising mode of political 
participation. 
II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF CONSUMER ACTIVISM ON POLITICAL  
SPEECH AND POLITICAL POWER 
I have argued that one consequence of campaign finance deregulation 
is the politicization of the retail economy through a process that could be 
called the hydraulics of campaign finance de-regulation. Ironically, the 
politicization of the retail economy leads to many of the same problems 
that were theorized to have been caused by first-order hydraulic effects. For 
example, the politicization of retail transactions probably reduces the 
amount and authenticity of speech produced by businesses, business 
leaders, and aspiring business leaders. Some individuals will feel so 
worried about the unpredictable future effects of disclosed campaign 
donations on their careers that they will not make political donations. At 
 
30 Stuart Elliott, Selling Products by Selling Shared Values, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/14/business/media/panera-to-advertise-its-social-consciousness-
advertising.html [http://perma.cc/PF9G-2HQR]. 
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the time that Brendan Eich made his $1000 donation to support Proposition 
8, the movement to oppose same-sex marriage had significant public 
support; Proposition 8 won the majority vote of Californians.33 Mr. Eich did 
not foresee that a mere six years later, public sentiment on same-sex 
marriage would have changed so much that his donation would cost him 
his job. Some will likely conclude that if donations can have significant, 
unforeseeable consequences in the future, they should be avoided 
altogether. 
Moreover, the marketplace of ideas may be distorted when a large, for-
profit company spends money to engage in “cause” marketing and to 
promote its CEO as a champion of the cause. If the company is taking a 
political position for marketing purposes, it is not advancing a policy 
preference relevant to the company’s operations, but rather pandering to the 
political views of the majority of its consumer base. Critics of corporate 
political speech often argue that it distorts the marketplace of ideas by 
amplifying the speech of corporate insiders; perhaps, instead, corporate 
political speech amplifies the viewpoint of the typical customer, creating a 
sort of company–consumer echo chamber that drowns out minority 
voices—and ensures that corporate leaders will be careful not to endorse 
minority viewpoints on any subject. 
Significantly, the politicization of the retail economy heightens the 
“single issue advocacy” problem associated with outside spenders like 
Super PACs that are critiqued for contributing to “the polarizing, attack 
orientation of contemporary political advertising.”34 Consumer protests and 
boycotts tend to rally participants around a single issue—even more so than 
Super PACs—and they not only accentuate attack-style politics but also 
take them to a new level, literally attacking donors for associating with a 
cause. 
The politicization of consumer transactions is worrisome because it 
may reflect a sense among voters that the electoral process is completely 
broken. This is not a concern about voter turnout, which has remained 
essentially the same in federal elections for years.35 Rather, the concern is 
that voters feel their fundamental relationship with power has changed. The 
politicization of consumer transactions is about holding donors, rather than 
elected officials, accountable for corruption or the appearance of 
corruption. It takes for granted what the Supreme Court denies—that 
 
33 Chris Cillizza & Sean Sullivan, How Proposition 8 Passed in California—And Why It Wouldn’t 
Today, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/03/26/
how-proposition-8-passed-in-california-and-why-it-wouldnt-today/ [http://perma.cc/HHE2-N9J4]. 
34 Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 5, at 1715. 
35 See Voter Turnout, CENTER FOR VOTING  & DEMOCRACY, http://www.fairvote.org/research-and-
analysis/voter-turnout/ [http://perma.cc/7HWR-MS89]. 
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politicians are strongly influenced by electoral spending, even (or perhaps 
especially) by secret, outside spending—and gives the masses a mechanism 
to punish the beneficiaries of this corrupt system.36 
On the other hand, consumer action is counter-majoritarian in a way 
that might, in some circumstances, offset the concentration of influence in 
the very wealthy. Corporations and their leaders are risk averse. They have 
shown a willingness to change their behavior in the face of consumer 
action by vocal minority groups of customers. Using tools like the Internet, 
consumer activists can leverage a small amount of public interest into a 
controversy with measurable economic consequences for their targets; in 
the face of such risks, companies and CEOs have sometimes folded 
quickly. Consumer activism thus holds the promise of restoring to ordinary 
Americans some of the political influence lost (or felt to be lost) through 
deregulation to the business-donor class. 
What is more, the politicization of the retail marketplace encourages a 
rich form of civic participation. If Americans can effectively communicate 
political preferences through easy, everyday activities—like shopping 
online—they will engage in more political expression, perhaps even 
making it a part of daily life. This may be a sort of public dialogue that 
government should encourage, or at least not stifle. 
III. HYDRAULIC EFFECTS AND ECONOMIC REPRISAL 
Whether second-order hydraulic effects are good or bad for expression 
or democracy, the judicial branch stands in a unique position to repress 
them. The First Amendment has become a potential judicial tool for 
defeating not only spending limits but also campaign finance disclosure. 
And without effective and swift disclosure, consumer activism is disarmed. 
The mechanism of consumer disarmament, if it comes, will be the judge-
made concept of “economic reprisal.” This is the idea that disclosure 
exemptions should be available to political donors who are threatened with 
economic pressure by private actors, such as consumer boycotts, if that 
economic pressure would chill the donor’s political speech. 
Economic reprisal emerged as an idea from a series of civil rights-era 
cases concerning the First Amendment associational rights of NAACP 
members who were targeted by hostile state governments in the South. In 
1958, in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, the Supreme Court 
invalidated a judgment of civil contempt against the NAACP for its refusal 
 
36 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010) (“Ingratiation and access . . . are not 
corruption.”); see also McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014) (“Campaign finance 
restrictions that pursue [objectives other than quid pro quo corruption] . . . impermissibly inject the 
Government ‘into the debate over who should govern.’” (quoting Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom 
Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2826 (2011))). 
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to comply with a court order to disclose its membership rolls to the state, 
holding that the order violated the First Amendment associational rights of 
the NAACP’s members.37 The Court found that the NAACP had made “an 
uncontroverted showing that on past occasions revelation of the identity of 
its rank-and-file members has exposed these members to economic reprisal, 
loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations 
of public hostility.”38 
The Court expressly stated that it was “not sufficient” that the 
“repressive effect” of the disclosure of the NAACP’s membership rolls 
“follows not from state action but from private community pressures.”39 
“The crucial factor,” the Court wrote, “is the interplay of governmental and 
private action, for it is only after the initial exertion of state power 
represented by the production order that private action takes hold.”40 
Although the Court did not contemplate it at the time, this analysis could 
describe a forced CEO resignation (based on private community pressures) 
following the compelled disclosure of the CEO’s campaign donations. 
Economic reprisal was reimagined as a potentially potent tool against 
campaign finance disclosure in 1976 in Buckley v. Valeo.41 In Buckley, 
disclosure opponents argued that compelled disclosure of the identities of 
contributors to minor party candidates would chill speech based on “fears 
of reprisal.”42 The Buckley Court upheld the challenged disclosure laws as 
applied to minor party candidates and their supporters, but only because it 
found no evidence of public hostility of the magnitude present in NAACP v. 
Alabama.43 The Buckley Court was careful to leave the door open to 
disclosure exemptions in cases of reprisal, and it articulated a standard for 
such a case: disclosure can be defeated if a politically active spender shows 
“a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of a party’s 
contributors’ names will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals 
from either Government officials or private parties.”44 
In 1982, the Supreme Court applied the Buckley exemption standard to 
an Ohio campaign finance disclosure law and granted a disclosure 
 
37 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958).  
38 Id. at 462. 
39 Id. at 463. 
40 Id. 
41 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
42 Id. at 69–74. 
43 Id. at 74. 
44 Id. “There could well be a case, similar to those before the Court in NAACP v. Alabama and 
Bates, where the threat to the exercise of First Amendment rights is so serious and the state interest 
furthered by disclosure so insubstantial that the Act’s requirements cannot be constitutionally applied.” 
Id. at 71. 
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exemption to the Socialist Workers’ Party (SWP).45 The Ohio law had 
required political parties to disclose the names and addresses of their 
contributors. In Brown, the Supreme Court found sufficient proof of 
“specific incidents of private and government hostility toward the SWP and 
its members within the four years preceding the trial” to establish a 
reasonable probability that disclosure would subject SWP members to 
threats, harassment, and reprisals.46 In addition to “threatening phone calls 
and hate mail, the burning of SWP literature, the destruction of SWP 
members’ property, police harassment of a party candidate, and the firing 
of shots at an SWP office,” there was also “evidence that in the 12-month 
period before trial 22 SWP members, including 4 in Ohio, were fired 
because of their party membership.”47 Because campaign finance disclosure 
made it possible for private actors to target members of the Socialist 
Workers Party in a way that, in part, made it “difficult for them to maintain 
employment,” the Court held that the party’s members should be exempt 
from disclosure.48 
Since Brown, only one court has exempted campaign donors from 
disclosure based on threats, harassment, and reprisal, and the case did not 
involve consumer boycotts or forced resignations.49 But since that 2004 
case, disclosure opponents have been increasingly aggressive about making 
economic reprisal arguments, and a number of recent cases have concerned 
or discussed California’s Proposition 8, the campaign that led to Eich’s 
resignation.50 In recent cases, some Supreme Court justices have indicated 
that they believe disclosure exemptions should be granted generously. 
Proposition 8 was a 2008 California ballot initiative in which a 
majority of California voters voted to amend California’s constitution to 
prevent the state from recognizing same-sex marriages. California 
disclosure laws compelled the disclosure of the name, address, and 
employer of anyone who spent more than $100 to support or oppose the 
 
45 Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 100 (1982). A few 
months before Brown, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted an as-applied 
disclosure exemption to a group supporting candidates of the Communist Party, U.S.A. See FEC v. 
Hall–Tyner Election Campaign Comm’n, 678 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1982). 
46 459 U.S. at 99–100. 
47 Id. at 99. 
48 Id. 
49 See Averill v. City of Seattle, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1178 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (allowing donors 
to a candidate to remain anonymous because they espoused political views that were “virtually 
identical” to those of a group, the Freedom Socialist Party, which the court found had been subject to 
threats, harassment, and reprisal). 
50 See, e.g., Bailey v. Me. Comm’n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 900 F. Supp. 2d 
75, 84–85 (D. Me. 2012) (rejecting as-applied exemption to campaign finance disclosure law); 
ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 830 F. Supp. 2d 914, 935 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (same). 
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ballot initiative.51 Evidence emerged in a series of cases about Proposition 8 
that two individual donors who supported the ballot initiative were forced 
to resign from their jobs after their donations were publicly disclosed, and 
one donor took a “voluntary leave of absence” from her job after protesters 
appeared at her workplace—a restaurant.52 In his dissent in Citizens United, 
Justice Thomas described these events in detail and argued that they 
amounted to “intimidation tactics” that chilled political speech protected by 
the First Amendment.53 
A few months after it decided Citizens United, the Supreme Court 
upheld the Washington Public Records Act in a facial challenge involving 
another referendum about same-sex marriage, but left open the possibility 
that the law, which compelled disclosure of the names and addresses of 
persons who signed referenda petitions, could fail in an as-applied 
challenge.54 In a series of concurrences (and one dissent), the justices 
expressed radical disagreement over the proper standard for granting as-
applied disclosure exemptions. Justice Scalia’s concurrence revealed his 
skepticism that any constitutional basis exists for courts to grant 
exemptions to state disclosure laws in cases of alleged threats and 
intimidation. “[H]arsh criticism,” he wrote, “short of unlawful action, is a 
price our people have traditionally been willing to pay for self-
governance.”55 Justice Sotomayor wrote that those seeking exemptions to 
referendum disclosure laws “bear a heavy burden.”56 Such exemptions, she 
argued, should be available only in the “rare circumstance” where 
“disclosure poses a reasonable probability of serious and widespread 
harassment that the State is unwilling or unable to control.”57 Justice 
Stevens argued that the exemption standard should require “a significant 
threat of harassment directed at those who sign the petition that cannot be 
mitigated by law enforcement measures,” and cautioned against granting a 
reprisal exemption based upon “an indirect and speculative chain of 
events,” a description that could apply to a forced CEO resignation.58 
 
51 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84211(f) (West 2005). 
52 ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1200–01 (E.D. Cal. 2009).  
53 558 U.S. at 482–83 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Thomas, alone 
among the current members of the Supreme Court, believes that the Constitution protects a right to 
anonymous political spending. See id. at 480. 
54 See Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 205–06 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring). 
55 Id. at 228 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
56 Id. at 214 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Justices Ginsburg and Stevens joined in Justice 
Sotomayor’s opinion. Id. at 212. 
57 Id. at 215. 
58 Id. at 218–19 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Breyer joined in Justice Stevens’s opinion. Id. at 
215. 
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In Justice Alito’s view, however, courts should be generous in 
granting as-applied exemptions. This generous standard would require 
speakers to “show only a reasonable probability that disclosure will lead to 
threats, harassment, or reprisals”; Justice Alito argued that the burden 
should be met “without clearing a high evidentiary hurdle.”59 Justice 
Thomas, writing in dissent, observed that as-applied exemptions will 
involve “[s]ignificant practical problems,” mainly because the exemption 
standard is so unclear.60 
After NAACP, Brown, and Reed, it is clear that a campaign donor may 
be exempted from campaign finance disclosure laws in cases of threats, 
harassment and reprisal—and that “private hostility and harassment” that 
make it “difficult” for donors to “maintain employment” may justify an 
exemption.61 What remains to be decided is whether consumer protests and 
boycotts, and “forced resignations” of business leaders, amount to 
economic reprisal of the sort that will justify an exemption. 
Justice Thomas’s point in Reed about practical problems with the as-
applied exemption apparatus is a significant one. The current exemption 
regime requires courts to grant exemptions on a fact-intensive, case-by-
case basis. Because this is true, there is potential for different courts to 
come to different outcomes on similar facts, which is likely to encourage 
exemption demands. Notably, the as-applied exemption mechanism is 
likely to frustrate disclosure during the precise timeframe when voters need 
disclosure of information: the weeks or months before an election. In fact, 
demands for exemption could be strategically timed to defeat pre-election 
disclosure. Economic reprisal arguments premised on consumer boycotts 
and forced CEO resignations provide the business-donor with a potent 
lever to protect his political influence. 
Ultimately, courts should find that a CEO’s forced resignation is not 
economic reprisal of a magnitude that would justify a disclosure 
exemption. Today more than at any time in the past, the American CEO 
resides in a fishbowl. Her paycheck and retirement benefits are often a 
matter of public record, as are her trading activities in her company’s stock, 
and even the life insurance premiums paid by the company on her behalf. 
Controversy over such matters can lead to a CEO’s ouster. A CEO’s use of 
any social media is scrutinized by the government and the public and may 
give rise to a securities action against the company, with career risks for the 
 
59 Id. at 204 (Alito, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
60 Id. at 241 (Thomas, J., dissenting). As it happens, there was no allegation in the case that any 
member of the Washington group had been fired or forced to resign because of a disclosed political 
donation.  
61 Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 99 (1982). 
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CEO.62 A CEO’s purchase of a home, country club dues, personal security 
expenses, and use of the corporate jet have all been put under the 
microscope and shown to correlate with firm performance.63 Even the 
“facial characteristics” of CEOs have been studied in relation to CEO 
compensation.64 A recent study suggested that public disclosure of a CEO’s 
divorce can cause the company’s stock price to fall if the CEO lacked a 
prenuptial agreement—suggesting that the terms of the CEO’s most 
intimate relationships may be a proper subject of investor scrutiny.65 In 
such a climate of inquisition, disclosure of a CEO’s campaign donations 
hardly stands out as invasive. 
It is clear, moreover, that an individual who is pressured to resign from 
a corporate executive office because of a disclosed campaign donation is 
unlikely to remain unemployed for long and, as Richard Briffault has 
noted, is likely to be wealthy and thus less vulnerable to economic 
pressure.66 The paradigm of economic reprisal from NAACP v. Alabama—
an anonymous, blue-collar worker fired by employers who disagree with 
the worker’s political views—is not implicated in such cases. 
In February 2014, ExxonMobil CEO Rex Tillerson made headlines by 
signing onto a lawsuit to stop construction of a water tower in the Dallas 
 
62 In 2013, Netflix CEO Reed Hastings precipitated an SEC investigation of Netflix when he made 
an observation about the company on his personal Facebook page. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, SEC Says Social Media OK for Company Announcements if Investors Are Alerted (April 2, 
2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171513574#.
U1rrAvldVHU [http://perma.cc/W36W-RF54]. 
63 See, e.g., Yaniv Grinstein et al., The Economic Consequences of Perk Disclosure (Johnson 
Graduate Sch. of Mgmt., Paper No. 06-2011, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1108707 [http://perma.cc/YR3Q-8MU3]; Crocker Liu & David Yermack, Where Are 
the Shareholders’ Mansions? CEOs’ Home Purchases, Stock Sales, and Subsequent Company 
Performance (October 17, 2007) (working paper) (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=970413 [http://perma.cc/D8VK-PC4Y]); David Yermack, Flights of Fancy: 
Corporate Jets, CEO Perquisites, and Inferior Shareholder Returns (March 2005) (working paper) 
(available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=529822 [http://perma.cc/JQ8W-
D9D8]). 
64 John R. Graham et al., A Corporate Beauty Contest 3–4 (March 15, 2010) (working paper), 
(available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1571469 [http://perma.cc/5HQU-
GP5F]) (a CEO’s subjective “look of competence” affects CEO compensation but is not associated with 
superior performance). 
65 See David F. Larcker et al., Separation Anxiety: The Impact of CEO Divorce on Shareholders 1 
(Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at Stanford Univ., Paper No. CGRP-36, 2013) (available at 
http://public-prod-acquia.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/36_Divorce.pdf [http://perma.cc/R4UZ-
UBCB]) (observing, inter alia, that the announcement of CEO Rupert Murdoch’s divorce, which 
involved a prenuptial agreement, caused News Corporation’s stock to trade 1.4% higher, whereas CEO 
Harold Hamm’s divorce, which did not involve a prenuptial agreement, caused Continental Resources’ 
stock to fall 2.9%).  
66 See Richard Briffault, Two Challenges for Campaign Finance Disclosure After Citizens United 
and Doe v. Reed, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 983, 1005 (2011). 
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suburb where he has a home.67 The lawsuit specifically objected to the 
tower because it might be used to supply water for fracking, a controversial 
and profitable process for harvesting natural gas that ExxonMobil uses.68 
Tillerson and ExxonMobil became the focus of negative attention by the 
national media; Tillerson was labeled a hypocrite by a commentator in 
Forbes.69 In April, a few weeks after Brendan Eich’s resignation from 
Mozilla, Tillerson quietly dropped out of the water tower dispute.70 Was 
Tillerson’s speech chilled, or his right to petition the government infringed, 
by the controversy? So far, the First Amendment has not been found to 
protect CEOs under these circumstances, and it should not be read so 
broadly as to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
As second-order hydraulic effects play out, they will force the 
Supreme Court to confront its own value judgments about expression. 
Under Buckley, money is speech and spending money is an act of political 
expression.71 But is money speech only for the wealthy in the ways that 
wealthy people spend money—committing lavish funds to support a 
candidate or cause in an election? Or is money speech for ordinary 
Americans too, in the ways that ordinary Americans spend their money—
buying groceries from companies that share their values? Is the former 
laudable for increasing speech, and the latter deplorable for reducing it? Or 
is consumer action itself a valuable contribution to the marketplace of 
ideas? If the Supreme Court tries to contain this hydraulic problem by 
finding that consumer pressure on businesses constitutes economic reprisal, 
and thus justifies exemptions from disclosure, significant swathes of 




67 Nicholas Sakelaris, Exxon CEO, Dick Armey Sue to Stop Water Tower in Bartonville, DALL. 
BUS. J., Feb. 24, 2014, http://www.bizjournals.com/dallas/news/2014/02/24/exxon-ceo-dick-armey-sue-
to-stop-water-tower-in.html [http://perma.cc/M84C-RMGW]. 
68 Id. 
69 See Rick Ungar, Exxon CEO Profits Huge as America’s Largest Natural Gas Producer—But 
Frack in His Own Backyard and He Sues!, FORBES, February 22, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/
sites/rickungar/2014/02/22/exxon-ceo-profits-huge-as-americas-largest-natural-gas-producer-but-frack-
it-in-his-own-backyard-and-he-sues/ [http://perma.cc/LYR7-M4YL]. 
70 Nicholas Sakelaris, Rex Tillerson Drops Out of Water Tower Lawsuit in Bartonville, DALL. BUS. 
J., Apr. 21, 2014, http://www.bizjournals.com/dallas/news/2014/04/21/rex-tillerson-dropsout-of-water-
tower-lawsuit-in.html [http://perma.cc/P9PM-SYCA]. 
71 See 424 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1976). Not all Supreme Court Justices have subscribed to this view. See 
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Money is 
property; it is not speech.”). 
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